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RESPONDING TO CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
Raiders, Management, and Boards of Directors
by Murray Weidenbaum

Freedom Awards
Announced
The Trustees and Officers of the Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge have announced the selection of
Harding University for three awards. Dr. David Burks,
President-Elect and Director of the American Studies
Program, will receive the Valley Forge Honor Certificate for Excellence in the category of Community
Programs. The American Studies Program trains young
men and women for leadership careers in business,
public life, and education. According to Dr. Burks, "We
are especially pleased that our hallmark American
Studies Lecture Series has been honored for bringing
to the campus ideas, opinions, and view points which
are basic to American citizenship."
Dr. David Tucker, will receive the Valley Forge
Honor Certificate in the category of Economic Education, as a result of his directing the Walton Scholarship Program for Central American students. Funded
by Sam Walton, founder of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , the
Program emphasizes the application of the principles
of freedom, democracy, and private enterprise to
developing countries. According to Tucker, "I am
especially happy for Mr. Walton, and I am so proud
for our Walton scholars. Without them , this award
would not be possible."
Dr. Don Diffine, will receive the George Washington
Honor Medal in the category of Published Works, for
his article, "All American Economics - Made in the
U.S.A." Printed in the Journal of Private Enterprise
and Arkansas Business, the article describes and
analyzes Sam Walton's pioneering "Buy American"
campaign. Diffine affirmed, "Above all, this honor is
a salute to Mr. Walton for courageously stepping forward and asking all Americans to join him in committing themselves to leave our country and our way of
life a little better for the next generation than it was
when we found it."

As news about hostile takeovers hits the headlines and not
just the business pages, names like Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn
and Ivan Boesky have become far better known than the CEOs
of General Electric, General Motors. General Foods. General
Mills or any other general. Takeovers have also developed
a colorful vocabulary of their own - "poison pills," "shark
repellents," "junk bonds," "raiders:· "white knights," "wolf
packs," and "greenmail."
Beyond the glamour there is a genuine public policy debate
about takeovers that deserves examination and evaluation.
This report looks at the arguments put forth by the " raiders"
and "entrenched management" and then discusses tht potential but vital role of a third force in corporate takeovers.
INTRODU(TIO'\
Many members of Congress have become concerned over
what is viewed as a rising trend of hostile mergers. " I think
it is time for Congress to send a clear signal to corporate
America that we will no longer tolerate unrestrained warfare between top managements for control of corporate
assets." That stirring indictment of competition in the market
for corporate control was stated by Representative Peter
Rodino, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
In that spirit, in the last session of Congress, more than
50 bills were introduced to deal with mergers and acquisitions. Over 20 hearings on the subject were held by nine different committees. However, no single piece of legislation
came close to passing.
Opinions vary sharply on many aspects of corporate
takeovers, and especially those initiated by shareholders who
oppose existing managements. Many economists and other
scholars contend that this process keeps executives on their
toes and thus enhances shareholder value. The executives of
these same firms, in striking contrast, assert that hostile attempts to change corporate control reduce business produc-
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tivity and performance. They argue that unfriendly tender
offers divert management attention and corporate resources
from the serious business of producing and distributing goods
and services.
Yet, on reflection, if the raiders are opportunists, it is boards
of directors and senior executives who have given them the
opportunity. Too many CEOs and boards have focused on the
ballet and the opera as the epitome of a corporation's responsibility to society. They seem to forget that a business is an
economic institution, designed to provide goods and services
for consumers in order to benefit the shareholders.
The irony is that some of the problems of the takeover
"targets" have arisen from their desire to be more socially
responsible. The modem business literature tells management
to balance the desires of employees, customers, suppliers,
public interest groups, and shareholders. For example, the
Committee for Economic Development, in its influential
report on the social responsibility of business, states that the
professional manager regards himself as a "trustee" balancing the interests of many diverse participants and constituents
in the enterprise. It is interesting to note that shareholders
are only listed as one among those worthy groups - and they
are listed last.
THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Three key arguments are offered by those who believe that
corporate takeovers are harmful and should be regulated more
fully by the federal government:

Hostile takeovers are socially and economically
detrimental. Hostile takeovers are viewed as leading to forced
liquidations or restructuring of viable companies by "raiders"
who reap considerable profit. The process is supposed to leave
the companies in weakened and highly leveraged positions.
The groups initiating hostile takeovers are considered to be
mere financiers and speculators who are not serious about
the operations of the companies, and who are in it solely for
quick profits.
In this view, takeover threats force managers to look to the
short term in order to keep their current stock price high.
This diverts attention from longer-term investment potential
and growth. Alfred Chandler, Jr., the distinguished business
historian of the Harvard Business School, worries about the
rising trend of unfriendly takeovers: "How can anyone justify
it? It provides no productivity, services, or function ... While
our managers are fighting takeovers, the Japanese are finding
it easier to take over their markets."
The common argument offered by economists who assume
that markets are "efficient" is that mergers, even hostile ones,
provide economic gains in the form of economies of scale,
better management and more productive allocation of
resources. The very threat of a takeover is supposed to
discipline inefficient management. Redeploying assets in
restructured companies may cause some unemployment and
community dislocations, but the assets do not disappear from
the economy. The new investors have a strong economic incentive to put them to productive use. Thus, hostile takeovers

are seen as creating real value for both bidders' and target
companies' shareholders.
Management's rejoinder to the economists is that short-term
increases in share prices are not the appropriate basis for
evaluating the costs and benefits of takeovers. Nor do all
economic analyses of stock data support the standard view
that stockholders of the target necessarily benefit from
takeovers. A study at the University of Maryland of 78
mergers and takeovers in the period 1976-81 concluded that
three years later the price of the acquirers' stock was much
lower than if it had continued performing as it had before
the acquisition.
To sum up the controversy about takeovers, the shareholders
of the target firm usually benefit but those of the raiders rarely
do. The takeover effort must therefore reflect a lack of concern by the raiders with the interests of their shareholders.
The academic supporters of takeovers look down at existing
management of target firms because of their supposed lack
of concern for their shareholders. To be consistent, it is equally hard to deify the managements of the "sharks," who have
little more regard for their own shareholders.

Credit markets are negatively affected by "nonproductive" merger activity. Speaking for the Federal
Reserve System, Board Chairman Paul Volcker says, "I ...
have concerns about the potential risks associated with
mergers and takeovers when these transactions involve
unusual amounts of leveraging." After acknowledging that
many mergers may have positive social effects, Volcker warns
that "these potential benefits clearly are diminished if the
mergers are accompanied by more fragile balance sheets or
more precarious loan portfolios."
Other critics view takeovers as draining resources from
longer-term investment and growth-enhancing activities. In
the event of default on "junk" bonds, many financial institutions may be adversely affected. Takeover activity is also
criticized because of large "transaction costs" benefiting
lawyers, investment bankers, accountants, and printing and
advertising firms.
The responses to these arguments take many forms. The
concern over transaction costs is put into perspective; their
large absolute size (in millions of dollars) is dwarfed by the
billions of dollars involved in the financing process. To the
critics of junk bonds, the rejoinder is that the risk-reward ratio
of these securities is in line with the economics of the market
and basic principles of financial analysis. One risks more in
order to earn more. Moreover, the credit is not "used up"
but recycled in the economy.

Abuses have crept into the takeover process. One
prominent attorney describes the situation as follows: "We
have entered the era of the two-tier, front-end loaded,
bootstrap, bust-up, junk-bond takeover." In this view, the free
flow of information has been impeded and the relative
economic power of bidders and management has been altered.
The use of high-yield, low-rated "junk" bonds to finance acquistion is one such example.

Investment bankers note two current practices that may be
considered to be "abuses." One is the ability to commence
a takeover without having binding financial commitments in
place. Such conditional bids have a headline-grabbing effect
and stampede the shares of the company into the hands of
arbitrageurs and speculators. The second abuse involves the
tactic of putting a company into " play." Seemingly deliberate
leaks drive the shares of the company into the hands of shortterm speculators.
The proponents of takeover efforts note that many other
abuses arise from the efforts of managements to repel unsolicited overtures. They contend that shareholder value is
reduced when companies adopt "poison pills" and other
"shark repellents."

ALTERNATE PUBLIC POLICY APPROACHES
Proposed responses to the problems generated by hostile
takeovers range from laissez-faire to tough new legislation
designed to "correct" the perceived market failures. Here are
the five key alternative approaches :

I. No problem exists, therefore, no "solution" is
necessary. The prevailing academic view is that the market
for corporate control is functioning reasonably well. Given
the passive roles of many boards of directors, hostile takeovers
are helpful in keeping companies on their toes and in replacing inefficient , entrenched managements. If there is any role
for public policy, it is to prevent management from thwarting the will of the shareholders.

2. There is a problem with regard to hostile takeovers,
but it will cure itself. Those in this second category believe
that the hostile takeover phenomenon will cool substantially
when the next serious recession reduces the earnings of the
highly leveraged companies. Many corporations being
restructured to a riskier mode as a result of leveraged buyouts
may go "belly up." These negative experiences will dampen
the ardor of other potential hostile suitors and reduce the
funding available to them.
In this second view, the takeover wave will subside as a
result of natural causes and hence no change in public policy
is warranted.

3. There is a continuing problem, but it can be handled
with further changes in tax policy. Because the tax deductibility of interest is a key element of most hostile takeovers,
this group contends that changes need only be made in tax
provisions favoring debt over equity.
Interest charges are tax deductible while dividends are taxed
twice, once at the corporate level and again at the level of
the individual shareholder. Even though the current tax reform
legislation will remove capital gains advantages for equity
financing, the reduction in corporate and individual tax rates
will reduce tax differentials for debt versus equity overall.

4. The federal government should resort to additional
regulatory devices. One possibility is to tighten the criteria
for allowable investments for life insurance companies and

pension funds. Some favor the SEC investigating trading
"abuses," such as manipulation of stock prices via false
rumors, leaks, and other sharp arbitrageur practices.

5. The takeover problem is so serious that tough new
legislation is required. The aim is to make it more difficult
for shareholder groups to make tender offers that are not endorsed by the company's board of directors.
Most of the bills introduced in Congress to regulate corporate acquisitions are designed to protect target companies.
For example, one bill would give outside directors of a target
company the right to veto a tender offer or the acquisition
of a controlling interest , subject to reversal by a vote of the
shareholders. Another bill would prohibit open market purchases by one corporation of more than 20 percent of
another's stock. Yet another legislative proposal would deny
successful acquirers a tax deduction for interest on debt incurred to finance their acquisition .
Moving across the spectrum of government intervention
in corporate governance is no simple matter. Each of the more
activist approaches is likely to generate serious and often
unexpected side effects - the "government failure" that so
frequently accompanies attempts to deal with "market
failure."

CONCLUSIONS
Contests for control of some large companies have focused
national attention on hostile takeovers. Yet these transactions
represent only a small fraction of the changes in control of
American corporations carried out each year. Most takeovers
continue to be friendly and approved by the boards of both
companies involved. In many cases, the board of the target
firm may have required a bit of coaxing - such as the threat
to "walk away" and see the price of the target company's stock
drop sharply.
Considerable evidence shows that takeover contests are
beneficial for stockholders of target companies. In this regard,
it is intriguing to note the views of top executives of the most
successful firms toward their stockholders. In one recent
study, two faculty members of the Harvard Business School
report that none of the top executives of the 12 successful
American companies they studied was concerned about the
current market value of the company's stock. One CEO stated
this position very clearly:
The highest priority with me is perpetuation
of the enterprise. I'd like to leave this joint in better shape than when someone passed me the
baton. I have to take care of the shareholders in
this, but I don't sweat the shareholders too much.
Most investors in our industry are passive.
The two researchers concluded that the successful managers
were committed "first and foremost, to the enhancement of
corporate wealth, which includes not only the firm's financial assets reflected on the balance sheet but also its important human assets and its competitive positions in the various
markets in which it operates."

Do corporate takeovers promote economic efficiency? The
great bulk of the academic literature states that the answer
is yes. Why else, the reasoning goes, would share prices rise
on the mere announcement of a hostile takeover effort?
One comprehensive study shows that tenderers have not
managed the businesses they acquired any more profitably
than their industry peers. Nor have they achieved significant
profitability improvements relative to the pre-takeover situation. In addition, the Congressional Tax Committee says a
large portion of the stock price gain is due to capitalizing the
tax benefits.
Yet there is no need - or justification - to argue that all
takeover attempts are benign or that every effort to repulse
them is laudable. Some businesses benefit from new management or even the threat of a change in management. Some
"shark repellents" benefit small stockholders by providing
barriers to two-tiered tender offers. Reasonable amounts..9f
self-interest can be expected on the part of both those attempting corporate takeovers and those opposing them .
The most significant factor to take into account in evaluating
proposals for government to "do something" about hostile
takeovers is historical. The long and intricate experiences of
government involvement in business decision-making are not
impressive. Study after study shows that government often
does more harm than good when it interferes in private
economic matters. The presence of some shortcoming in the
private sector (often called "market failure") is not sufficient
cause for government to intervene. Much government regulation fails to meet an elementary benefit-cost test.
The heart of a positive response to unsolicited takeovers
is not poison pills or shark repellents nor is it government
restraints on raiders. There is a third and often neglected force
designed to foster stockholder interests, the company's own
board of directors.

Under law, all corporate power is exercised by or under
the authority of the board. Directors must really act as
fiduciaries of the shareholders. But the complacent or rubberstamp director has not totally vanished from the boardroom.
Responding more fully to the desires of the owners of the
business is the key to repelling takeover threats. Corporate
officials, both board members and officers, often forget until the company's stock is in play that shareholders continually
vote with their dollars.
The most important, and rarely performed, duty of the
board is to learn how to say no. It is up to the board to veto
proposed capital investments whose yield is below the cost
of capital - even if some key executive is going to get upset
because it was his or her pet project.
The outside directors especially must learn to act on the
knowledge that the inside directors who serve on the board
with them are occasionally motivated by different concerns.
Acquisitions may be good for executives whose compensation is related to the size of the company, but some can be
poor investments for shareholders. A supergenerous corporate
donation to the ballet may do wonders for the social life of
the CEO, but it hardly benefits the shareholders.
The challenge to many boards is to pay out more cash for
shareholders and to reduce outlays for low-yield projects. The
record is clear: If the board will not make the difficult choices
that enhance the value of the corporation , the takeover artists will. Takeover mania is not a cause but a symptom of
the unmet challenge.
Outside directors are the heart of the critical third force
in contests for corporate control. They need to bear in mind
that the future of the corporation is in their hands - as long
as they serve the desires of the shareholders.
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